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Should Cost Analysis has become a popular "catch-phase" with people
involved with DoD major systems acquisitions in the 1980' s. This analysis
technique is generally recognized as an effective tool for the Government
to achieve cost reasonableness with negotiated contracts . In an attempt
to enable acquisition managers to challenge contractor's cost, Congress
has legislated the use of Should Cost analysis on major weapons systems.
This research examines the Should Cost concept, capabilities of this
technique, the Should Cost legislation, and presented several key manage-
ment issues of Should Cost analysis. The research has conducted through
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I. INTRODUCTION
Should Cost analysis has "become a popular "catch phase" in the vocabu-
laries of those involved with or interested in Department of Defense major
acquisitions. Should Cost analysis is often described as a technique that
inables the Government to pay a defense contractor only what a product
should cost. This technique is said to be a proven technique and will
solve many of the procurement cost problems of DoD major acquisitions.
Problems in the defense acquisition process and aggressive critics of
the process moved Congress to take more assertive legislative action in
FY 86 to get the defense acquisition process under control. One such
action was the passage of an amendment in the FY 86 DoD Authorization Act
that would require Should Cost analysis in major defense acquisitions.
Although it would be hard to disagree with the notion that the Govern-
ment should only pay defense contractors what a product should cost, one
must understand that Should Cost analysis are not as simplistic a con-
cept as described and believed by many. In order to appreciate the capa-
bilities of Should Cost analysis, one must understand the concept and the
issues surrounding the concept.
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. The primary question to be addressed in this study is: "What is the
Should Cost concept and how is it used in defense acquisitions?"
2. The subsidiary question is: "What are the key management issues
surrounding the Should Cost concept?"
The Should Cost legislation and the Should Cost process of cost esti-
mating have raised several concerns to the researcher:
-What is Should Cost analysis and how does it differs from traditional
cost estimating techniques?
-What are the stated and underlying requirements of the Secretary of
Defense and the military services as a result of the Should Cost Le-
gislation?
-What can Should Cost analysis accomplish as far as solving procure-
ment ills?
-What are the key issues in planning and executing a Should Cost analy-
sis:
-Can the DoD efficiently accomplish a Should Cost analysis on a major
weapon system?
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this research is to examine and answer these ques-
tions. This will update the literature as to Should Cost analyses in
the DoD. Additionally, it will provide insight for the military service
acquisition managers as to the impact of the Should Cost legislation and
provide recommendations on how to implement the legislation's flowdown
requirements.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
This study will focus on reviewing the Should Cost concept and the
key management issues of Should Cost analyses. It will examine past
Should Cost analysis efforts and identify key problems and issues asso-
ciated with this technique. The limitations of Should Cost analyses and
how DoD might perform Should Cost analyses at the major defense system
level will also be examined. This study will not examine the anlytical
techniques employed in performing a Should Cost analysis. The results
of this study will be the presentation of those issues considered to be
germane to the Should Cost concept as a whole. Additionally, an analysis




The research data was collected by means of literature search, tele-
phone and individual interviews. A history of the issues leading up to
this study was developed from the literature search and interviews.
Interviews were conducted with Government personnel that have either been
involved with a Should Cost analysis or are knowledgable of Should Cost
analyses, from the military systems commands. Also, interviews were con-
ducted with two major sole source defense contractors and two major com-
petitive source defense contractors that have had Should Cost studies con-
ducted on them. They were queried about the Should Cost legislation, key
issues and problems in conducting a Should Cost analysis, and issues of
the Should Cost concept as a whole. Interviews were held on a nonattri-
butable basis to aid the researcher to gain honest and candid responses.
Personnel interviews are considered to be the most appropriate research
method since most available information on the subject is outdated. The
questions posed included:
-From your perspective, what prompted such wide spread interest in the
use of Should Cost in major acquisitions?
-What are the key management issues and problems that you have encount-
ered in preparing for a Should Cost analysis?
-What are the key management issues and problems that you have encount-
ered during the initial Government/industry interface?
-What are the key management issues and problems that you have encount-
ered during and after the conduct of a Should Cost analysis?
-What do you see as the constraints to a Should Cost analysis?
-How does industry view Should Cost?
-What are the overall important issues germane to the Should Cost concept?
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE
1. Introduction
Chapter I will define the research problem and why this problem
is important. The environment and events leading up to the time of the
research is presented.
2. Background
Chapter II presents the economic, social and political environ-
ments that prevailed during the period of the research.
3. The Should Cost Concept
The issue of Should Cost analyses and the factors surrounding the
acquisition process are presented from a historical perspective.
4. The Should Cost Analysis Process
The methodology and the key issues of planning and conducting a
Should Cost analysis are presented.
5. Analysis of the Should Cost Lesgislation
The Should Cost legislation contained in the Department of Defense
Authorization Act, 1986 is analyzed as to its implications and require-
ments by the Secretary of Defense and the military services.
6. Key Management Issues of the Should Cost Concept
Key management issues germane to the Should Cost concept which
were developed from interviews with Government and industry are presented.
7. Conclusions and Recommendations and Areas for Further Research
Conclusions are based upon findings. Recommendations are made
regarding the use of the information developed.




A nation's ability to effectively manage and properly allocate its
resources is an essential element for achieving and maintaining national
stability. Being able to compete in the world's trade market, maintain
internal security, and flourish as a nation are dependent on the prudent
management of all national resources. Recent examples of the decaying
U.S. steel, oil, and automotive industries show how past mismanagement of
these areas have resulted in the U.S. being heavily dependent on foreign
nations for these resources. This reliance has weakened the U.S. indus-
trial base, which directly affects the security of our nation.
There are three broad categories of resources; manpower, material,
and money. In the United States, money is the one resource that drives
the availability of the remaining resources. In order to acquire man-
power or material, adequate financial resources must be available. As in
most nations, the available resources are inadequate to satisfy all of the
national needs. Therefore, those financial resources that are available
must be efficiently spent and effectively allocated to satisfy the nation's
most critical needs. [1:51
1. Allocation of Resources
Since 1983 the Department of Defense (£0D) has obtained an average
of 27.6$ of the total budget authority for military purposes. It is esti-
mated that between the years 1987 and 1990, the DOD will average 30.8^ of
the total budget authority for military purposes, reflecting a steady
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increase from the recent past (primarily from 1976 to 1982) average of
only ZJ0Q of the total budget authority. In contrast, with the exception
of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), social/environment
related Government organizations saw a constant reduction of their budgets
between 1979 and 1985 . DHHS's budget has experienced a modes 3.8^ growth
between 1979 and 1985 [2].
The perception by this country's leadership in the late 1970' s was
that America's military hardware was outdated and needed replacement. This
perception lead to DoD receiving an constantly increasing share of the
total Federal Budget. Efforts were soon underway to modernize each ser-
vice component of the DoD with the most modern equipment available. Rapid
modernization of the military forces became a top priority of this nation's
leaders
.
2. Government Resource Management: The Problem
The 1980 *s not only brought new hardware for the services, it also
brought scathing reports of cost mismanagement in DoD procurements.
Examples of the types of reported cost abuses are:
.... Overruns last year (l98l) averaged 140 percent .... Most
of the overruns .... 243 billion dollars woth .... occurred in
military projects [3: 13]
.
.... The Navy cut its order of Harpoon antiship cruise missiles by
47 percent but still would up with cost more than double the initial
billion dollar estimate [3:13].
.... The Navy spends $7,622 for a coffee brewer [4:417],
.... Fifteen of the 20 larges defense contractors under criminal
investigation [5:1135].
These reports of Government mismanagement of programs were numerous
and raised serious questions and criticisms of the DoD's ability to con-
trol costs in their procurements. In addition to these continuing reports
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of DoD cost mismanagement, the federal deficit was nearing $2 trillion [2]
and heated debates concerning military vs social programs funding raged
constantly on Capitol Hill.
A former top level defense acquisition expert named Norman Augustine
made these observations of the DoD. Augustine believed that in 1980, the
DoD met or exceeded its general performance goals about 75 percent of the
time. Schedule overruns of one third or more were believed to happen at
least one third of the time. The probability that a major program would
be completed within its initial estimates for research and development,
and procurement was about nine percent. The probability that a program
would be completed with not more than 50% cost overrun was not better
than 70%, Augustine also believed that the average cost overrun was 52%
while the median was 32^. Although Augustine admits that over the last
30 years this trend has gradually improved, he also states that there is
a long way yet to go for the acquisition system to meet its cost and
schedule goals. [6:27,28,52].
The reasons for the DoD not consistently achieving its goals, pri-
marily its cost goals for major acquisitions, are complex and numerous.
The main cause is attributed to program instability [7:?]. Program in-
stability causes problems in many areas of program management. One such
area is that of funding and the budgeting process. Several of the charac-
teristic budgeting problems are: [7:9]
a. Underestimating cost
b. Program stretch-out
c. Criticism of management ability
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B. GAD REPORTS
At the request of the Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, the GAO examined the DoD structure and how weapon systems were
costed. The resultant report was titled DoD Needs to Provide More Credi-
ble Weapon Systems Cost Estimates to the Congress . The conclusions of
this report stated [ 8:1] :
DoD cost estimating guidance needs improvement and stricter implemen-
tation to ensure that cost estimates are uniform, consistently developed,
and well documented. GAO found that using more reasonable assumptions
and independent cost estimates would result in more accurate reporting
to the Congress.
The DoD challenged many of the findings of the report, and was sus-
tained on several of their challenges [ 8:28-36].
Shortly after this GAO report, another GAO report was published in
October 1984 titled Compensation by 12 Aerospace Contractors . This review
was conducted in response to a request by Jack Brooks, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Legislation and National Security Committee on Government
Operations, House of Representatives. The GAO was requested to review
the reasonableness of compensation paid in aerospace firms in relation to
that paid to employees in other industries [ 9* 1 ] • The findings and con-
clusions of this report were [9*15-16]:
The contractors, on average, paid executives and clerical, technical,
and factory employees more than the average pay for similar positions
surveyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the American Man-
agement Association (AMA). Professional salaries (mostly engineers)
were slightly below the BLS averages. Some of the contractors* pay was
about the same as BLS and AMA and some was much higher.
The GAO was unable to draw any conclusions on whether the compensation
paid by aerospace contractors was reasonable. The report did recommend
that defense contracting officials examine compensation carefully during
negotiations, and to find a workable means of assessing the reasonable-




In an attempt to regain public confidence in defense spending,
Congress passed the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984 . Congressional
policy and findings concerning the DoD's cost management that were the
basis of this legislation were stated as: [10: 31 6]
The Congress believes that excessive payments for spare parts by the
Department of Defense has undermined the public confidence in the de-
fense procurement process, and enunciating certain policies to ensure
that spare parts are procured in an efficient and cost effective man-
ner. The recurrence of seemingly inexplicable occurrences such as
these mandate legislative attention. While acknowledging the recent
initiatives undertaken by the Department of Defense, only legislation
will ensure that the recent initiatives will result in systemic changes.
The Procurement Reform Act of 1984 contained additional legislation
that stressed the use of competition in defense acquisitions, and it gave
the Government easier access to contractor's technical data and proprie-
tary data for use in future competitive acquisitions [10:102-119].
2. Government Investigations of Contractors
By 1985 > stories of Government procurement waste became a daily
topic of the news media and in most American homes. The environment was
such that most people associated with Government procurement used extra-
ordinary caution in performing their daily contract related responsibili-
ties. In the midst of "whistle blower" reports of exhorbit prices paid
for spare parts, unfavorable GAO reports on the DoD's management of major
acquisitions and reports of gross waste in the supply system, the time
was right for aggressive and unprecedented actions to be taken to begin
correcting the Government's procurement ills.
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Investigations were launched by Justice Department, Department of
Defense Inspector General (DoDIG), :and the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) into alledged cost, quality and product impropriety allegations
of numerous major defense contractors. As a result of these investiga-
tions, several of the nation's largest defense contractors were suspended
from doing further work with the Government [ 11:906]. One such suspen-
sion was levied against the nation's number three defense contractor for
submitting false claims to the Government. The suspension of these large
defense contractors was a bold and unprecedented move by the military
services which sent a clear signal to everyone that things were not
"business as usual" in the DoD.
Shortly after the suspensions were levied, Rep. John Dingel (D-Mich)
released a list obtained from DoD Inspector General Joseph Sherrick of
major defense contractors under criminal investigation. A seemingly ap-
propriate capstone to the massive amounts of unfavorable attention al-
ready generated about the DoD acquisition process, this list revealed
that one third of the top 100 defense contractors were under criminal in-
vestigation. Sach of the top nine defense contractors were listed for
alledged offenses such as cost mischarging, subcontractor kickbacks, false
claims, defective pricing, and bid rigging. The overall perception of
the relationship between the DoD and defense contractors was described by
Rep. Dingel who said, "The list of major contractors released today makes
it clear that the types of violations found in recent cases are a way of
life throughout the industry." [5]
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3. Congressional Mandate of Should Cost
By early 1985, many members of Congress were introducing several
pieces of legislation for the DoD Authorization Act, 1986. Table 1 is
a list of the various proposed amendments offered "by members of Congress
for the upcoming authorization act.
Title IX Procurement Policy Reform and Other Procurement Matters of
the DoD Authorization Act, 1986 contained legislation that specifically
addressed the areas of: [12:104-114]
-false claims, debarments, burden of proof, and related matters;
-Government procurement personnel employment with defense contractors and;
-program management matters.
It was clear the Congress intended to become more involved in the
DoD's management of acquistions.
In an attempt to rectify the problems of poor cost estimates typical
in DoD and to give Government officials the ability to challenge contrac-
tor's costs, the Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to report the
programs marked for Should Cost analyses to the Congress. Included in
the legislation is criteria to identify those programs that are considered
mandatory Should Cost candidates. The Secretary of Defense would have to
submit a list of those programs planned for Should Cost analyses. Addi-
tionally, the Secretary would have to submit a list of those major acqui-
sitions that are not planned for Should Cost analyses with justification
why these acquisitions are not planned to receive and analysis. [12:110]
In constructing the language of the Should Cost amendment, the House
and Senate conferees decided that the agreed to final version of the amen-
dent would allow the Department of Defense to utilize its resources where
17
they would provide the most significant return, but ensure that Congress
had adequate oversight of their use. 12:453
TABLE I
GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS OFFERED TO H.R.
1872 RELATING TO THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
-Acquisition of Weapons Systems
— Civilian Director (4)**
~ "Should cost" plans/reports (l)**
-Civil/Criminal Penalties
— Convicted employee working on DOD contracts (l)**
— Employment with DOD contractors (4)**
— Submission of unallowable G&A costs (8)**
-Competition
— Competition plans (3)**
— 5 percent per year increase in competitive awards
(1)*
— Use of multiple sources (3)**
-Contract Prohibitions
— Contractor/subcontractor convicted of fraud (l)*
— Contractor/subcontractor officer of employee
indicted for fraud (l)*
— Specified G&A costs (8)**
-Contracting Officer Assignments (l)*
-Contracting Out (restrictions) (3)**
-Cost or Pricing Data
— Categories of data required (l)**
— Comparison with actual costs (l)**
-G&A Costs
— Specified expenses unallowable (8)**
— Certification of costs (8)**
-DOD Inspector General
— Assignment of "compliance officers" to debarred
contractors (2)*
— Suspension of contract payments and debarment of
contractors (2)
-Minority/Small Business Set-Asides (3)*
-Progress Payments (l)
-Renegotiation Act (reinstatement) (l)
-Selection Acquisition Reports (l)*"*
-Subpoena of Contractor/Subcontractor Records (8)**
* Subjects included in H.R. 18?2 as passed by the House
** Subjects covered in the compromise DOD AUTHDRIZATION ACT reported by
the House/Senate vonferees.
Source: Hienstand, O.S. "Do Miracles Ever Happen In Congress?" Contact
Management
.
September 1985» PP« 8-11.
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III. SHOULD COST ANALYSIS CONCEPT
A. INTBDDUCTIQN
Congressional action has legislated the performance of Should Cost
analyses on major weapon system's production costs. One Defense Depart-
ment official indicated to the researcher that this legislation will pre-
sent a major management challenge to those acquisition managers who will
be tasked with carrying out its requirements. The challenge for these
managers will be to perform Should Cost analyses in an efficient and ef-
fective manner, consistent with the intent to the legislation, and with
the current resources. In order to meet these challenges, the manager
must be knowledgable of exactly what a Should Cost analysis consists of,
how does it differ from traditional cost estimating approaches, and what
can and can not be obtained from a Should Cost analysis. Understanding
these fundamental concepts will then allow managers to concern themselves
with the issues of Should Cost analyses that are essential to conducting
effective Should Cost analyses.
B. COST ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES
1. The Should Cost Concept
The concept of Should Cost analyses implies a particular methodology
taken to determine what a contractor's production costs ought to be. Should
Cost analysis consists of employing an integrated team of Government con-
tracting, engineering, audit and pricing specialists to conduct an indepth
review of all phases of the contractor's plant and operations. An example
of the elements examined are, the contractor's engineering and manufacturing
19
operations, accounting procedures, cost estimating systems, purchasing
procedures, make or buy decisions, organizational structure, and any
other elements of cost and management control required for contract per-
formance [ 14: 1-11] . A Should Cost analysis considers all activity in a
contractor's plant and is not directed at one program or product [ 1: 13 1
.
The intent of the Government is not to tell contractors how to run their
business even though inefficiencies may be determined through Should Cost
efforts. Instead, the Government presents the findings to the contractor,
and makes it clear that taxpayers* money will not be paid out for demon-
strated inefficiences [15:8].
The purpose of Should Cost analyses is to develop a negotiation
objective that will support the contracting officer's efforts in negotia-
ting a fair and reasonable contract price [ 13* 1] • A secondary purpose of
Should Cost analyses is to bring about both short-range and long-range
improvements in the efficiency and economy of the contractor's operations
[ 14: 1-5 ]
2. Traditional Approach
Traditional cost estimating approaches use historical cost as the
baseline for contract negotiations. Traditional cost analysis is com-
prised of conducting a cost audit and technical evaluation of the contrac-
tor's past cost and performance data, and his proposal rationale for the
instant contract. The results of thes independent analyses are furnished
to the contracting officer who evaluates and reconciles the reports in
order to establish the Government's cost objective [13:2]. When past
operations were inefficient, such projections of cost will automatically
have a built-in cost factor to cover the cost of the continued inefficiency
[14:1-21].
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3. Should Cost vs Traditional Approach
The Army Should Cost guide states that should cost differs from
the traditional approach to cost analysis principally in two respects,
the depth of the analysis and the extent to which the Government challenges
inefficiencies in the contractor's operations [ 14: 1-2] . Two additional
differences were revealed during the researcher's interviews that should
be included; the Should Cost team is resident in the contractor's plant
until the analysis is complete, and the team leaders are comprised of per-
sonnel independent of the program or contractor under review. Therefore,
the differences between the Should Cost approach and the traditional ap-
proach to* cost estimation as viewed by the researcher are:
-the depth of the analysis;
-the extent to which the Government challenges inefficiency;
-team resides inplant until analysis completed and;
-teamleaders are independent of the programs under review.
G. CAPABILITIES OF SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
1. What Should Cost Can Achieve
Various Government officials interviewed offered what they saw as
the capabilities of Should Cost analyses. The benefits that were identified
are:
a. Set Negotiation Target
Should Cost analyses provide the Government with a negotiation
target with adequate backup data to support that target. A Government
negotiator who has been involved in the Should Cost review and has an
intimate understanding of the numbers and recommendations of the Should
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Cost team, will be able to negotiate a more reasonalble price for the
Government than he could have negotiated if this information was not
available to him.
b. Identify Non-recurring Costs
Another benefit of the Should Cost analysis is that Govern-
ment representatives can identify costs, such as non recurring costs and
other start up costs, that should not be included in subsequent production
contracts. A Government official interviewed revealed that these complex
costs are often difficult to segregate and identify under traditional
analysis techniques, and the Government frequently pay non recurring cost
several times in later production contracts because these costs are easily
hidden by the contractor.
c. Identify and Challenge Inefficiencies
Should Cost analysis can uncover inefficient operations in a
contractor's plant. With a highly skilled Government team, dialogue can
begin with the contractor of how the identified inefficiencies might be
corrected. Information concerning how the contractor is performing in
relationship to others in the same industry is vital to that contractor
.
Much of the management data that contractors could use to evaluate them-
selve against other contractors is considered proprietary data and is
difficult to obtain. The Should Cost team can identify areas of ineffi-
ciencies in a contractor's plant, and recommend methods to correct these
inefficiencies to the contractor. Although a sole source relationship
may exist between the contractor and the Government, the contractor is
still interes-ced in becoming efficient. This is because in order to remain
viable in the market in the long run, that sole source contractor must
produce efficiently.
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d. Foster Better Government/industry Relations
The identification of a contractor's inefficiencies and the
recommending of solutions to solve those inefficiencies by the Government,
can make the contractor a better industry competitor if those recommenda-
tions are adopted. Interviews with industry officials indicate that, when
a Should Cost team conducts a thorough and professional analysis of a
contractor's operations, the contractor is generally impressed and commends
the Should Cost team members on their efforts. The attitude between the
contractor and the Government is often changed from antagonistic to sup-
portive of the team's endeavors.
The benefits of Should Cost analyses mentioned are not inclu-
sive, but rather the most common ones obtained from interviews. The tangable
cost benefits that have accrued from past Should Cost analyses have been
well documented. As a result of the many benefits that have been derived
from past utilization of Should Cost analyses, this method is often viewed
as the answer to all of the DoD's cost control problems.
2. Limitations of Should Cost
In contrast to the benefits of Should Cost analyses, there are
several limitations of this technique,
a. Cost
Perhaps the main limitation to using the Should Cost method
of cost analysis is that it is a costly technique . This technique requires
the utilization of highly skilled specialists for an extended period of
time . Past Should Cost efforts manpower requirements ranged from as few
as 8 persons to as many as 80 persons. Depending on the depth of the
analysis, Government personnel may be away from their homebase anywhere
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from a few weeks to several months. The costs incurred by the Government
for personnel salaries, travel, and lodging of a Should Cost team are
significant.
b. Qualified Personnel
The old saying "Garbage in - Garbage out" is particularly
applicable in the case of performing a Should Cost analysis. To achieve
the benefits of a Should Cost analysis, the Government team must be ade-
quately staffed with experienced and skilled personnel. A large portion
of the analysis is spent by team members performing individual data
collection, analyses, and forming conclusions. Team members must be
sufficiently trained to perform these tasks. Failure to have these
trained personnel will cause the contractor to suspect the validity of
the entire process, and produce less than desired results. Therefore,
the benefits of a Should Cost analysis are limited by the availability




Similar to the resource limitation, adequate up front planning
is essential to the success of the Should Cost effort. Initiating a Should
Cost analysis with inadequate time or planning will result in chaos for
the team and discredit the Government with the contractor. Interfacing
far in advance with the contractor to determine what is needed by both
parties to make the analysis a smooth one is essential. Research indicates
that the vast majority of problems that are encountered during a Should
Cost analysis are due to insufficient planning, insufficient time to pro-
perly plan the evolution, or failure to include the contractor's input
into the plans.
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d. Only a Budgeting/Negotiation Tool
Although Should Cost identifies what a product should realis-
tically cost under efficient conditions, it is nothing more than a
technique to budget costs and a negotiation tool. The proponents of
Should Cost analyses who think that it is a panacea to the cost overrun
problem or the excessive spare parts pricing problem do not fully under-
stand the Should Cost analysis concept.
Costs that exceed the amount of costs initially budgeted, are
considered cost overruns. A Should Cost analysis provides and efficiency-
based estimate of a product, if produced under the particular conditions
assumed by the Should Cost team. This estimate is only useful for budge-
ting the costs of a program and as a negotiation target for the negotiator
to strive towards. If the assumptions made by the Should Cost analysis
team are incorrect, or program requirements change and additional costs
are incurred, then a cost overrun will occur. Therefore, Should Cost
analysis is only a budgeting tool that provides a cost estimate for a
product based on a particular set of assumptions and circumstances.
e. Should Cost Not Applicable to Spare Parts Pricing:
Should Cost analysis is felt by some to be the answer to the
spare parts pricing problem. According to a DoD official interviewed,
the majority of spare parts pricing problems experienced by the services
are a result of proper allocation of overhead to the product. In these
instances, Should Cost would not have prevented theproblem. But the more
pertinent issue concerning Should Cost analysis and spare parts pricing,
is that Should Cost analysis is an efficient way to solve the problem.
The Government official interviewed said that the costs of the resources
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needed to perform Should Cost analyses on spare parts in the military
system would far exceed any benfit that the Government could possibly
derive from such an analysis.
Many benefits can be obtained by the contractor and the Government
as a result of Should Cost analyses. However, the costs incurred by the
Government to conduct a Should Cost analysis and the limitations of a
Should Cost analysis must be recognized.
D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1. Civilian Utilization
The civilian sector first utilized the Should Cost technique of
cost estimating. A large, nationwide consumer durable goods chain had
utilized a Should Cost method of pricing appliances and durable goods
from its suppliers for many. By analyzing its suppliers operations, the
retail chain was able to evaluate and determine what the supplies should
cost if they were produced efficiently. The retail chain had the ability
to convince its suppliers to submit to this review because it maintained
significant buying power in the market. Failure of the suppliers to
cooperate with the retail chain's estimating method would result in a
sizeable reduction in orders from the chain to that supplier. The results
of these evaluations encouraged the suppliers to search for more efficient
methods to manufacture their products to bring costs in line with the
Should Cost evaluation [15:14].
2. Military Application
The Department of Defense was the first Government agency to
utilize the Should Cost concept to estimate product cost. Under the direc-
tion of Mr. Gordon W. Rule, Director of the Procurement Control and
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Clearance Division at the Naval Material Command, a special negotiating
team was created to perform a Should Cost analysis on the production of
2,053 TF 30 engines for the F-lll aircraft produced by Pratt and Whitney
(P&W), in late 196?. This review was prompted by what the Navy considered
to be unrealistic cost proposals to a letter contract for the engines from
P&W. Initially, the team's objective was to assist in definitizing the
letter contract, but it soon became apparent to the team that the overall
objective could not be confined to simply pricing this isolated letter
contract. A DoD official interviewed indicated that the special team's
objective was expanded to include not only the definitization of the
present letter contract, but also to obtain a binding agreement with P&W
to make certain changes in their practices and procedures, and to obtain
certain improvements and innovations that would bring about economies and
efficiencies for future requirements.
This special negotiation team remained in the P&tf plant for three
months and utilized approximately 50 people to conduct the review. The
team was comprised of personnel from the Navy, Air Force, Navy Plant
Representative Office (NAVPRO), Defense Contract Administration Agency
(DCAA), and P&W. Each member was highly skilled in one or more areas of
management and/or production control. Areas of the P&W operation that
were specifically targeted for review were:
Labor Standards Mfg and General Overhead
Allowances Standard Material
Plant Capacity Material Variations
Machine Utilization Vendor Tooling
Labor Cost Make or Buy
Variations Purchasing
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As a result of this intense effort which took eleven months to complete,
the Government negotiated a contract that saved approximately $100 million
on that particular letter contract and savings estimated to be many times
that amount on future procurements from P&W.
Following the Navy's Should Cost Study on Pratt and Whitney, the
Air Force conducted a Should Cost study on the Minuteman II program in
late 1967, and the Army performed a Should Cost study on the Hawk Missile
program in 1970. [16:17-17, 17:1-1]
3. Competition Simulation
Each of the DoD initiated Should Cost studies were done on contrac-
tors who were in a sole source relationship with the Government. For a
long time, it has been recognized that contractors in a sole source
relationship with the Government have limited incentive to be efficient.
This is because the Government is reimbursing them for their incurred
costs and paying a profit based on these costs. In this type of arrange-
ment, generally the greater the total costs, the more profit. Therefore,
contractors are actually incentivized to be inefficient and drive cost
up inorder to realize greater profit. In the competitive marketplace,
the forces of competition prevent this phenomena from occuring.
4-. Guidance
Should Cost analysis is recognized as a tool that can yield
significant savings for all federal agencies in negotiated procurements
if used properly. A DoD official interviewed indicated that immediate
savings averaging 15^ of the proposal price have been achieved with
Should Cost analysis. However, the DoDIG reported that the average
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yield was 7 to 8 % [l8:ll. In any event, long term cost avoidance is
attained when management improvement recommendations from the Should
Gost effort are implemented,
a. PAR
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is the
acquisition regulation governing procurement in the Federal Government,
incorporates the concept of Should Gost analysis as a specialized form
of cost analysis and provides guidence for its use.
The FAR describes Should Gost analysis as a specialized form
of cost analysis employing an integrated team of Government contracting,
contract administration, pricing, audit and engineering representatives.
The objectives of a Should Gost analysis are to identify inefficiencies
or uneconomical practices in the contractor's operations and management,
quantify the cost of those practices to develop a realistic negotiation
objective and to recommend changes that will lead to both long and short
term improvements in the contractor's economy and efficiency. Addition-
ally, the FAR cites the conditions of the procurement that should prevail
to achieve the greatest benefit of a Should Cost analysis. The conditions
that are considered to be most conducive to a Should Gost analysis
involved a major weapon system acquisition where [19:15-39];
(1) Some initial production has already taken place;
(2) The contract will be awarded on a sole source basis;
(3) There are future year production requirements for substantial
quantities of like items;
(k) The items being acquired have a history of increasing costs;
(5) The work is sufficiently defined to permit and effective analysis
and major changes are unlikely;
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(6) Sufficient time is available to plan and conduct the Should Cost
analysis adequately; and
(7) Personnel with the required skills are available or can be assigned
for the duration of the Should Cost analysis.
b. DoD FAR Supplement
Should Cost analysis is also addressed in the DoD FAR Supple-
ment is an addendum of regulations to the FAR that covers the unique
needs of the DoD in the acquisition process. Guidance concerning the use
of Should Cost analysis is more specific in the DoD FAR Supplement than
the FAR. The DoD FAR Supplement states that [20:15.810]:
A Should Cost review will be made in connection with the procurement
of a system or item which will require a Defense System Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC) approval, unless the contracting officer makes
written determination that the potential savings to be realized do not
justify the expense of such a should cost review.
c. Service Guidance
Additional guidance on Should Cost analysis policies and
procedures have been promulgated by each of the military services. The
Air Force's governing directives concerning Should Cost analysis are the
Air Force FAR Supplement and the Air Force Systems Command FAR Supplement.
The Navy's governing instruction is NAVMAT INSTRUCTION 4330.37 dated 25
March 1974, and the Army's directive on Should Cost analysis is Army
Material Command Regulation 715-92.
5. Policies and Views of Should Cost
Each major military service, the GAO, and industry have expressed
policies and views on Should Cost analysis,
a. The Navy
The Department of the Navy currently has the most flexible
and loosely defined policy on the utilization of Should Cost analyses of
the three services.
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Although it was the initiator of Should Cost analysis in major
weapons acquisition (Pratt & Whitney by Gordon Rule, 196?) » the Navy has
not actively utilized this technique to any notable extent. This was
confirmed by two GAO studies [16: 18-19] [21:1-2]. Recently a DoDIG's
draft report on Should Cost utilization in the services reported that the
Navy had not performed a Should Cost analysis on any of its ^0 major
programs. [18:1]
According to several DoD officials interviewed, shortly after
the Pratt and Whitney study, Gordon Rule stated that "should cost" find-
ings have little use in affecting the terms and conditions of fully
definitized contracts. Mr. Rule felt that "should cost" has real applica-
tion at the time of definitization of letter contracts and fixed price
incentive successive target contracts. In such cases, the contracting
officer is able to unilaterally determine the final definitive price if
mutually agreeable prices can not be negotiated. Of course this determina-
tion is subject to appeal, but the contractor is required to continue
contract work until the appeal is settled.
The Navy*s policy on the utilization of Should Cost analyses
is contained in NAVMAT Instruction ^330.37 Should Cost , dated 25 March 197^.
This instruction makes utilization of Should Cost analyses discretionary,
but does give guidelines when Should Cost may be required [22]. Overall,
the Navy policy is that Should Cost is just one method of pricing which is
available to the contracting officer and it is applicable only when we
have reason to believe that a predominantly sole source contractor is not
meeting the test of reasonable economy [1:26].
The NAVMAT instruction was undergoing revision at the time of
this study. The revision is anticipated to emphasize the necessity for
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effective performance and reasonable pricing of Navy contracts. According
to Navy officials interviewed, this revision is not expected to mandate
or advocate the use of Should Cost analysis, to determine reasonable costs
in sole source production contracts.
b. The Army
The Department of the Army has a policy that is quite specific
and requires the use of Should Cost analysis in particular situations.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Econony in Government of the Joint
Economic Committee of the Congress, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(installation and Logistics) made the following comments in 1970 [14:1-6]:
This technique (Should Cost) will be used in major procurements
when genuine price competition is not existent and when it is determined
that such an indepth analysis is necessary in preparing for contract
negotiations
.
Since that time, the Army's basic policy on the utilization of Should
Cost analysis has been that this technique would be used with every major
weapons production contract for which there is not competitive bidding
[23:31.
Should Cost analyses will to be performed on all sole source
acquisitions in excess of 50 million dollars in the first and fourth years
of production, including multiyear acquisitions. A request to waiver this
requirement may be submitted by the PCO to the headquarters having authority
to grant relief. [23:3]
To support the Army's Should Cost endeavors, a guidebook
titled Should Cost Analysis Guide [ 14] has been published. This guidebook
covers the basic principals and techniques of Should Cost analysis and
serves as a reference for planning an analysis. Additionally, the Army
has established a Should Cost office at their Rock Island Arsenal. This
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office administers and coordinates all Should Cost efforts in the Army.
The Should Cost office provides training for Should Cost team leaders,
assumes administrative control of personnel assigned to Should Cost teams,
and maintains the data base of Should Cost lessons learned.
The draft report of the DoDIG's audit of Should Cost utiliza-
tion in the services (1985)» concluded that the Army has conducted Should
Cost analyses on all noncompetitive major weapon acquisitions [18:1].
c. The Air Force
The Department of the Air Force's policy on Should Cost analysis
is similar to the Army's, but it limits the use of Should Cost analysis to
appropriate and selected situations. Mandatory use is limited to those
situations when the production contract exceeds a predetermined dollar
threshold (currently at 50 million dollars), the conditions in the FAR are
satisfied, and contracting environmental factors are such that the payoff
of such endeavor would outweigh the time, effort and cost involved in
conducting the analysis. The Should Cost requirement can be waived for
those contracts exceeding the dollar threshold only by submitting a waiver
request to the product division Commander. Large dollar value contracts
(excess of 30° million dollars) waiver requests can only be approved by
the Air Force Systems Command Deputy Chief of Staff/Contracting. [2^:ATCH2]
d. GAO Review of Should Cost Concept
In 1969 a report titled The Economics of Military Procurement ,
was published by the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic
Committee. In this report, the Subcommittee expressed its concerns as to
the traditional method of pricing negotiated contracts was protecting the
interest of Government adequately. The Subcommittee recommended that the
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GAO study the feasibility of incorporating the Should Cost method of cost
estimating into its audit and review function of contractor performance.
In May 1970, the GAO completed its study and concluded that
it appeared feasible to include Should Cost concepts in its reviews.
However, the GAO added that it had neither the statutory authority or the
negotiating position with contractors needed to derive the most benefit
from Should Cost analyses. tl6:2l
e. Contractor's View
Interviews with industry officials reveal that industry supports
the basic concept of Should Cost analysis. However, overwhelming enthusi-
astic support from the contractor for a technique that challenges the way
he does business should not be expected. This finding is slightly different
from that found in Haight *s thesis, The Applicability of "Should Cost" to
the Procurement Process , 197^ • Haight concluded that the atmosphere was
not conductive to the kind of dialogue which, in the long run, could be
of great benefit to both (industry and Government), and ultimately to the
entire defense industry relationship [1:28] . This researcher has concluded
that the atmosphere has changed such that the dialogue can begin.
During the 10 years since Haight "s thesis, the relationship
between Government and industry has improved, judging from the comments
received by the researcher from Government and industry officials. They
said that the Government has improved its planning and execution of Should
Cost analyses and industry has learned of the value that they can obtain
from this process. Industry officials indicated that generally, major
defense contractors do not have an accurate method of comparing their level
of efficiency with their competitors. However, to remain healthy and
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viable in the long run, even the sole source contractor must concern
himself with being efficient.
Some industry officials interviewed perceived the Should
Cost analysis as providing contractors with a "free" management evaluation
of their efficiency compared to others in the same industry. Also, these
analyses suggest efficient methods that currently exists in the market
place to help the contractor be more efficient. Although viewed by some
contractors as "free" consulting, these contractors also understand both
the positive and negitive implications that the Should Cost analysis could
have on their company.
The feeling of "outsiders" coming into the contractor's
operation still prevails at most contractors, and personality and metho-
dology disagreements still exist. Some, industry officials indicated that
the inconveniences of Should Cost analysis are just part of being in busi-
ness with the Government.
6. Resurgence of Should Cost
a. Garlucci Report
In March 1981 » Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. Frank Garlucci
initiated a joint OSD, DOD, industry working group to make recommendations
on improving the acquisition process. The results of this study were 32
management recommencations that would shorten the acquisition process,
increase readiness, provide cost savings and strengthen the industrial
base [25:att 1] . This study became known as The Defense Acquisition
Improvement Program (DAIP) or the Carlucci Report .
Later in 1982 as a result of discussions between Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems), M. Paisley,
and the Under Secretary of the Army, J. Ambrose, a task force was formed
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to identify the most "beneficial Carlucci recommendations to implement
first for the Army and the Navy. The objective was to work together
to accelerate the implementation of the more significant DAIP decisions
through presentation of joint recommencations to Dr. DeLauer (Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) and Mr. Carlucci.
[26:1]
This joint DAIP implementation task force was chaired by
Dr. Yaru, Chairman of the Naval Research Advisory Committee Task Group.
The task force studied the Navy's acquisition process in July of 1982.
As a result of this review and the task force's understanding of the
Carlucci recommendations, 11 Carlucci recommendations were identified
that would contribute the most to the improvement to the Navy's acquisition
process [ 26]
.
One of the Carlucci recommendations identified by the task
force was Carlucci initiative number 6 titled, Budget to Most Likely Cost .
Carlucci initiative number 6 addressed the problem of inaccurate cost
estimates in major system acquisitions [ 26: 15] • The causes of these in-
accurate estimates primarily centered around unrealistic pricing and
scheduling in the advocacy phase of a system, and underestimation of inflation,
Two recommendations given to assist in alleviating this problem were; (l)
cost realism in proposals should be the basis for accepting or rejecting
a competitive proposal. (2) The Navy should develop a highly competent
"Most Realistic Cost" estimating team to establish the acceptable cost
range [ 26:15-161. Although the Carlucci recommendations were targeted




b. Taft's Overhead Cost Control Plan
Deputy Defense Secretary William H. Taft IV began researching
ways to reduce contractor's overhead cost in August 1984. The goals of
his investigation were not only to reduce the overhead costs, but also
to devise a plan to (l) incentivize contractors to voluntarily reduce
their overhead costs and (2) to improve DoD's oversight of contractor
overhead. The ground work for the effort was laid by a joint service
panel. Taft reviewed the panel's recommendations and approved them in
December 1984 [2?: 833].
As a result of the Taft study, ten principals of overhead
cost control were formulated. One of these principals was titled,
Discrete Cost Analysis which stated [28:911] :
Overhead costs are to be evaluated on an element by element basis,
concentrating on where management decisions are made. Pricing methods
which place undue emphasis on historical costs are to be avoided, and
evaluation tools such as hould cost, cost monitoring reviews and
operations audits should be used to the fullest.
One month following the release of the ten principals for
reducing overhead costs, Secretary Taft directed each military service
and the Defense Logistics Agency to conduct a Should Cost analysis of
plant wide overhead at one contractor's location by September JO , 1985
[29:28] . These Should cost analyses were to be the "test cases'* to determine
if Should Cost analysis is a viable method of cost reduction. As of this
writing, the feasibility of Should Cost analysis as a method of overhead
cost reduction had not been determined.
c. Should Cost Legislation
Legislation was being proposed by both houses of Congress to
improve the defense acquisition process throughout fiscal year 85.
Senator Dan Qualye (R-Ind), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
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Task Force on Selected Defense Procurement Matters announced that he was
introducing a package of amendments to the 1986 DoD Authorization Act
designed to improve the procurement process. One of the areas covered
was improved cost estimates [30:321] . Later, Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz) released a statement outlining
the committee's actions in its markup of the FY 86 Defense Authorization
Bill. Included in this statement was the committee's approval of an
initiative that required Should Cost studies on major defense systems
[31s 229]. This Should Cost amendment was unanimously adopted by the Senate
with similar language adopted by the House shortly afterwards.
The conferees recognized the benefits that can accrue from
Should Cost analyses, and the cost of conducting these analyses. They
wrote the language of the Should Cost amandment to allow the DoD to utilize
its resources where they provide the most significant return, but ensure
that Congress has adequate oversight of their use [ 12: 4531 • The final
language of the Should Cost amendment was agreed upon and passed as part
of the DoD Authorization Act, 1986 in late October 1986. An expert of
The FY 86 DoD Authorization Bill which includes the Should Cost amendment
is contained in Appendix A.
(l) DoD/Navy response. The Department of Defense opposes
mandatory use of Should Cost analyses, but do endorse discretionary use
of the technique shere it makes the most sense. The primary arguements
forwarded by DoD and Navy against legislated mandatory Should Cost are
[32:1]:
-Should Cost analyses are only one technique of ensuring sound business
deals, they are very expensive and labor intensive.
-Tough but fair hard nose negotiations on most noncompetitive deals are
probably a more cost effective means of ensuring reasonable pricing.
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-The Navy has moved aggressively toward increasing competition and this
is the best way of ensuring good contracts.
-The Navy is selectively using Should Cost now where it is reasonable
to do so.
d. DoDIG Audit of the DoD Should Cost Program
During the summer of 1985, the DoDIG launched an investigation
to determine what extent the military services were utilizing Should Cost
analyses. The draft report listed six elements that were considered
necessary for an analysis to be considered a Should Cost analysis. These
elements are [18:2-3]:
(1) Integrated team approach.
(2) Level 5 Work Breakdown Structure Analysis.
(3) Significant on-site work done by the team.
(k) Identify deficient contractor practices.
(5) Develop a sound negotiating position with members participating in
the negotiations.
(6) Make recommendations.
Based on these six elements, the draft report concluded that [18:1] :
-Army performed Should Cost analyses on all programs;
-Air Force performed Should Cost analyses on a selected basis and;
-Navy was not performing Should Cost analyses on any programs.
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IV. PLANNING & EXECUTING THE SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Should Cost analysis is a process that requires careful planning,
execution and monitoring to "be effective. Several excellent, indepth
studies and guides have been produced on the planning and execution of
Should Cost analysis. Some of the literature that examines these issues
are:
-"Should Cost" Lessons Learned by Gunther Lange
-Critical Success Factors for Should Cost Planning by Heitmand and King
-Should Cost SOP #3^+0 HQ U. S. Army AMCCOM
-Should Cost Air Force Pamphlet 70-5 Department of the Air Force
-Should Cost Analysis Guide AMCP 715-7 HQ U. S. Army Material Command
It is not the intent of the researcher to reiterate what is contained in
the existing literature on planning and executing Should Cost analysis.
This chapter will concentrate on presenting a broad overview and pertinent
elements of Should Cost analysis planning and execution, supplemented by
current issues presented to the researcher.
B. PHASES OF SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
Gunther Lange identified six phases of the Should Cost process. These
six phases are [33:2]:
-Phase I Preparatory Effort (Off-Site)
-Phase II Preparatory Effort (On-Site)
-Phase III Fact Finding/Analysis
-Phase IV Prepare Report
W)
-Phase V Prepare for Negotiations
-Phase VI Start Negotiations
Figure 3-1 is a Sample Master Schedule of these phases which could serve
as a management aid in planning the Should Cost analysis.
1. Phase 1 Preparatory Efforts (Off-Site)
This phase focuses on the agency having a proper foundation
organizational to conduct the Should Cost analysis. Phase 1 is by far
the most important phase of the Should Cost process [33:2] .
a. Selection of Should Cost Candidate
When selecting a candidate for a Should Cost analysis, the
primary considerations should be, reviewing the proper candidates and,
selecting candidates that the probability of achieving a beneficial out-
come is high [17:1-1] •
Lange presented five "Go/No Go" considerations that must exist
prior to a candidate being seriously considered for a Should Cost analysis,
They are D3: 3]
:
-Lack of price competition.
-Sufficient time to complete the "Should Cost" analysis before negotia-
tions.
-Procurement expected to be of high dollar value.
-Required special skills are available to the team.
-All major tasks required for contractor's performance are known and
defined.
The Air Force identified additional factors that are not
directly related to the Should Cost analysis itself, but should be inves-
tigated to further narrow the field of candidates to only those that are
most likely to yield benefits [ 17:2-2, 2-3 ] Appendix B is an excerpt from
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To further aid in reducing the field of candidates to the
optimum candidate, Lange suggests that the following questions concerning
the "Go/No-Go" characteristics be evaluated [33:3]:
-Which characteristic may be expected to maximize (or minimize) the
benefits of a "Should Cost" analysis?
-Among the characteristics identified, what factors (or weights) may
be used to describe their relative impact on the benefits to be realized.
-How may the data derived from the above considerations best be analyzed
to identify the optimum candidate for selection?
Table II is a checklist suggested by Lange as a guideline for
selecting Should Cost candidates.
TABLE II
SUGGESTED "SHOULD COST" RATING FOR CANDIDATE CONTRACTORS
A. Go/No Go Considerations
1. Lack of adequate price competition
2. Sufficient time to complete "Should Cost" analysis
3« Procurement expected high dollar value
4. Required special skills available
5. Tasks sufficiently well-defined
B. Weighted Considerations
1. Potential for significant follow-on business
2. Known or suspected specific problems to be solved or reduced
3. History of increasing costs, or improvements needed in cost controls
4. Probability of shifting cost risk to contractor by improving contract
type or cost incentive sharing arrangement
5. Preponderance of Government business
6. Probability that "should cost" benefits will extend into other
effort (e.g., development to production, other programs, etc.)
7. Existence of a good base of historical data to benefit the
"should cost" analysis
8. Manufacturing conditions not likely to change
9. Program not subject to excessive technical, quantity or schedule
change
10. Lack of confidence in current cost estimates
11. Government will have strong bargaining position
12. Potential for improvement in contractor's efficiency of manufac-
turing operations
13. Other factor (as appropriate)
SOURCE: Gunther Lange, Should Cost Lessons Learned , U.S. Army Logistics
Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia, November 1970
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b. Government Should Cost Organizational Structure
The proper organization and organizational philosophy of
Should Cost analysis must exist at the Government agency conducting the
analysis if this technique is to be effective, commented several DoD and
industry officials interviewed by the researcher.
The DoD PAR Supplement mandates the use of Should Cost
analysis for items requiring DSARC approval unless the contracting officer
makes written determination that the expense of the review outweighs the
potential savings [20:15-810]. Several of the Government officials inter-
viewed felt that pressures are often placed upon the contracting officer
by the program manager, contract administration personnel and the contractor
to waiver the Should Cost requirement. A Should Cost analysis is often
viewed as a possible source of perturbations for a program by these per-
sonnel. The decision to perform this analysis should be made by someone
higher in the organization than the contracting officer, according to
these officials.
Government and industry officials interviewed agreed that
involvement of senior defense officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense down to the buying activity is essential to the success of
Should Cost analyses. The researcher believes that senior personnel
involvement in the Should Cost analyses process will accomplish several
key elements for the process. These elements are:
-Establish credibility of Should Cost analysis with the contractor.
-Provide organizational comparability with large contractors.
-Ensure that the Should Cost analysis effort is properly supported
within the buying organization.
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-Relieve undue pressures on the contracting officer to waive the
Should Cost analysis requirement.
-To integrate program management participation in the Should Cost
process
.
From the comments made by DoD and industry officials interviewed, the
researcher concludes that the Government must have a firm organizational
structure that will support the Should Cost analysis process prior to
becoming involved in other phases of the process,
c. Selecting a Should Cost Team
The selection of the Should Cost team is an extremely impor-
tant event. Team members must be highly skilled, motivated and versatile
to be a productive participant in a Should Cost analysis.
A Should Cost team leader should be selected and given a
written charter. This charter will establish [33s 6]
:
-the task to be performed;
-his authority and responsibility during the analysis;
-his lines of communication;
-reporting requirements; and
-any constraints on time, resources, etc.
The team leader should be tasked with selecting the members
for the Should Cost team [33s7]» These selections are of vital importance.
Should Cost analyses subject the team members to extraordinarily unpleasant
working conditions. Team members should expect to be away from their
families for many weeks and work long hours. As mentioned previously,
team members are expected to be loyal, highly skilled in their areas of
expertise, self-motivated, tenacious, and versatile. The benefits that
accrue from a Should Cost analysis are directly dependent on the quality of
the team members. The Army Procurement Research Office published a study
^5
titled, Should Cost; Guidelines for the Selection of Team Members , that
addressed the selection of Should Cost team members [3^] • This study
reviewed the selection criteria and personal attributes that managers
should consider to aid them in identifying and selecting the best per-
sonnel for a Should Cost team. The researcher recommends that this study
be referred to for further information in this area.
Government Should Cost teams are matrix structure organiza-
tions comprised of personnel obtained from different functional areas
and organizations. DoD officials interviewed feel that the matrix
structure of Should Cost teams places an extra burden on the organization
unit that releases personnel to participate in a Should Cost analysis.
It was revealed that in general, supervisors are reluctant to release
personnel because:
-the loss of already scarce skills to a Should Cost team will have a
detrimental affect on their unit
-the long absences of team members with no replacement;
-increased work load on others from the work left by the team member,
d. Objectivity
To optimize the effectiveness of the Should Cost effort, the
objectivity of the effort must be maintained [33s 51* To aid in this
effort, the Should Cost team leadership should not be held by personnel
from the activity responsible for the negotiations [ 33s 5 1 • Government
officials interviewed identified as examples of personnel who should not
be in positions of Should Gost team leadership; contract administration
personnel, contracting officer, and various personnel tasked with managing
programs or portions of programs produced by the contractor. The officials
interviewed feel that these personnel have "built-in" biases that could
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affect their ability to conduct an objective analysis. However, it is
important that each of these categories of personnel are involved in the
Should Cost analysis because they have a wealth of knowledge that is
vital to the process.
Objectivity is also achieved by analyzing only objective
concepts and not those which are subjective or philiosophical . Several
industry officials commented that the Should Cost team member's method of
data collection, analysis, and conclusions must be able to withstand the
scrutiny of examination from other team members and the contractor for
validity and objectivity.
e. Initial Communications with Contractor
After it is decided which contractor will receive a Should
Cost analysis and the team leader for the effort is selected, the contractor
should be notified by a senior procurement official of the buying organiza-
tion by a formal letter. This notification should provide the contractor
vital information such as [14:2-5]:
-who is performing the Should Cost analysis
-the purpose and goal of the analysis
-what are the items of interest
-who is the team leader and who designated him
-when the advance team will arrive and leave
-the expected arrival date of the total team
-the approximate duration of the on-site work
-individual(s) to whom the contractor can direct questions
4?
2. Phase II Preliminary Efforts On-Site
The preliminary efforts on-site phase are concerned with orienta-
ting the key members of the Should Cost analysis team with the contractor's
plant and operations, and the types of data that are available for analysis,
From this initial visit to the contractors facility, the team leader can
get a better understanding of the scope of the Should Cost analysis to
be conducted. [33:12-14]
a. Briefings By Contractor/Contract Administration Personnel
Preliminary on-site efforts are performed by an advance team
consisting of the team leader, sub team leaders, and other key members of
the Should Cost team. They are briefed by the contractor on the various
organizational systems and interfaces, production methods, and controls
and policies employed. The cognizant contract administration organiza-
tion should also brief the advance team on topics considered pertinent to
the analysis. Sources of data, the availability of data and the format
of available data are determined. Finally, logistics considerations for
the Should Cost team are arranged.
b. Government/Contractor Strategy
Prior to concluding the preliminary on-site planning efforts,
industry officials interviewed suggested that the team leader and the
contractor hold discussions concerning the planned Should Cost analysis
process. During these discussions, the "ground rules" should be laid
down that establish how the analysis will be done. These officials were
primarily concerned with the Should Cost team analyzing data in such a
manner that would preclude making improper conclusions.
hS
c. Information From Other Sources
Following the preliminary on-site visit, the Should Cost team
leader must finalize the scope of the effort. In addition to the infor-
mation received during this advance visit, the team leader can investigate
other organizations that may have recently conducted audits, studys or
reviews on the contractor [ 35s 2 ]. Government officials interviewed said
that acquiring as much information on the contractor as possible prior to
beginning the data gathering/analysis stage of the Should Cost process,
will significantly aid the team leader in determining (l) the weak areas
of a contractor's operations and (2) the necessary scope of the analysis
to achieve it's objectives.
d. Requirements Letter to the Contractor
Once the Should Cost analysis task is sufficiently defined
and initial data requirements are determined, the team leader should
notify the contractor by letter. This notification should identify [ 23:M-1
-the members of the Should Cost team
-the data required, and the format required (a letter on this matter
may also be sent to the contract administration office)
-when the team will arrive and depart
It was suggested by Government and industry officials interviewed that
this letter have realistic deadlines to allow the data request and any
other issues. Government officials indicated that it would be beneficial
if the data requested from the contractor was received several weeks prior
to the fact finding phase. This would allow the Government to review and
began interpreting the data at home base prior to arriving on-site, instead
of spending valuable time performing these functions on site [ 35s 1 ] •
^9
3. Phase III Fact Findings
The Should Cost team should be broken down into sub-teams to
conduct the analysis. [14:4-8]. Each sub-team is assigned to an area
of the contractor's operation to analyze. Although a sub-team's investi-
gation in one area may lead into other areas, the objective is to minimize
duplication of effort among sub-teams.
a. Listening
One DoD official interviewed suggested that the initial stages
of the fact finding phase be devoted to careful listening. Often, contrator
personnel will lead the analysis effort to areas needing investigation.
This official also stressed that listening to the local contract adminis-
tration personnel can aid the analysis substantially. It has been known
for these people to surface problems to the Should Cost team that they
have had no success in solving with the contractor. Equipped with the
necessary skills and ability to solve many of these problems, the Should
Cost team frequently can assist the contract administration personnel in
finding solutions to this problems. This is one area where the Should
Cost team can support the contract administration organization and not
be considered a perturbation to the program or intruding outsiders.
b. Communications
Daily exchanges of information between team members, sub-teams,
and the team leader are important. Daily meetings should be held primarily
to discuss the nature of the team's findings. These meetings are necessary
to prevent members from spending a large amount of time evaluating low
priority areas [33s 21]. Daily status reports from the sub-teams to the
team leader should be required to give the team leader a record of the
sub-teams status and provide him with an overview of the issues encountered
[33»21].
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Daily reports should "be given to the contractor by the team
leader concerning the general progress of the effort. A free flow of
information between contractor personnel and the Should Cost team members
was suggested by an interviewed DoD official, although information con-
cerning specific findings should not be divulged,
c
. Data Acquisition
One important and extremely difficult task to achieve is that
of acquiring the data needed during the analysis effort and receiving it
in a timely manner. A contractor may inhibit the effectiveness of the
analysis by claiming that the requested data was not available or that
it would be available only after considerable effort or delay [33: 19 ]
•
This ploy is often used when a contractor is aware of the time constraints
that the Should Cost team is under, according to one Government official
interviewed
.
The question of the Should Cost team having the right to
examine the records of the contractor that do not directly pertain to the
contract being negotiated is often raised by the contractor, related a
DoD official interviewed. According to a 196? decision by the United
States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit in the HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY v.
UNITED STATES of America, the Government's right to access was upheld
[36:1013].
The judgement rendered was expressed in the following
manner [ 36: 1013 ]s
"Contract", within statute permitting United States to examine records
of contractor that directly pertain to, and involve transactions re-
lating to, the contract, embraces not only specific terms and conditions
of agreement but also general subject matter, and permitted United States
to inspect production cost records even though production costs had not
been considered in negotiating contract.
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This decision was later challenged in 1978 by the Eli Lilly Company when
the GAD attempted to gain access to Lilly's data and was refused [37 ]•
The Packard ruling was upheld and GAO gained access to Lilly's data.
Lange identified several procedures that can aid in minimizing
the data acquisition problems [ 33s 3-^1
•
-Obtain a list of every periodic report prepared by the company. This
list will allow the Should Cost team members to know what data is
available
.
-All data requests should be submitted in writing and signed by the
team leader or his deputy. Requests should clearly identify the data,
and specify the date by which the data is needed. A suspense file
should be maintained to allow the team leader or the deputy to remind
the contractor of the due date.
-The operations officer should receive and maintain all data from the
contractor. This centralized control establishes a focal point of
knowledge providing for the identification of data; dates of request
and receipt; and names of requestors.
-Whenever practical, at least two sets of data should be requested.
Once received and index card should be prepared for each data item.
One set is to be given to the team member that had requested it. The
second set should be placed in the file. This procedure allows all
team members to quickly determine if the team had previously received
a particular piece of data, thus eliminating any duplicate requests
.
Every effort should be made to avoid the duplication of data extraction.
4. Phase IV Report Writing
The Should Cost analysis report is the culmination of the Should
Cost team's analytical efforts. The report is a permanent record that
serves four main purposes [14:8-1]:
1. It will become the principal negotiating tool for the Government.
2. It will be useful for follow-up and surveillance by the cognizant
audit and contract administration agencies.
3. It will be helpful in communicating "lessons learned" to future teams.
4. It may be required to help support the Government's position in legal
or administrative actions.
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This phase has proven to he one of the most difficult stages of the
Should Cost analysis process. This difficulty is attributed to three
principal reasons [ 14:8-2]:
1. There are inherent difficulties in interdisciplinary communications
among such specialists as engineers, auditors, and contracting
people
.
2. There is a genuine shortage of people who are skilled in writing
effectively.
3. The urgency of the analytical effort often prevents team members
from gaining a real appreciation of the reporting task until they
actually start writing.
The factors listed above will always exists to some degree in the re-
searchers opinion, but their impact may be minimized if proper consider-
ation is given to these areas when selecting team- members and initial
planning of the effort.
a. Preparation of Report
To enable team members gain a full appreciation of the Should
Cost analysis report requirements, proper planning of the report format
must be exercised early in the planning phases of the effort. The format
should be the controlling factor for the method which data is to be stored
and retrieved. Team members must collect and structure the results of
their individual analyses such that all results are of a compatiable
format for the final report. Team members should begin "thinking" the
report as soon as they start fact finding. The format and objectives of
the report must always be in mind during the course of the team member's
investigations . [ 33: 2k ]
b. Assembling the Report
Assembling the individual sub-teams reports into a form that
is suitable for printing demands the effort of at least one person full
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time. This person should have outstanding administrative skills and be
dedicated to formulating and assembling the sections for typing. [33:25]
The Army recommends that Should Cost reports be broken down
in the following manner [14: 8-3] :
a. Section I. Introduction
b. Section II. The detailed evaluation plans used for the study.
c. Section III. Summary report containing the negotiation position
and alternatives and other general findings and recommendations,
with cross-references to the detailed data in Attachment 1 and the
contractor's proposal.
d. Section IV. Lessons Learned
e. Attachment 1 Detailed report which relates the analytical work
done and is the substantiation of the negotiation position.
The effectiveness of the Should Cost analysis is directly
related to the negotiator's ability to understand the Should Cost report.
This requires that sufficient detail be provided in the report to explain
the situation, the methodology, the reasons for analyzing certain aspects,
the findings and results, and the probable contractor responses [33:25] •
Therefore, the Report Writing Phase of the Should Cost process is most
critical
•
Lange recommends that the following points be considered to
help alleviate report writing problems [33:27]:
-Be certain that each writer and typists understands and follows the
report format.
-Employ the full-time services of a copying machine. The ability to
reproduce data is a significant time saver.
-Maintain a "status board" for each section of the report.
-Designate one individual to control typing priorities.
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-Do not waste time proofreading the first and second drafts. These
drafts should be read for content and organization only.
-Establish a review board that would review each draft of the report.
The board will also assist the proofreader in the final two drafts.
c. Briefing the Contractor
DoD and industry offcials interviewed suggested that the
contractor be briefed on the overall findings of the Should Cost team
and provided a summary report prior to the team leaving the plant. This
briefing and report should provide the contractor with a broad, general
knowledge of the Should Cost team's findings. However, Government
officials warned that specific cost quantifications attributed to ineffi-
ciencies must be closely guarded by each Should Cost team member. This
specific and detailed information will become the foundation for the
Government's negotiation position.
5. Phase V and Phase VI Preparations for and Conduct of Negotiations
In preparing for negotiations, the chief negotiator must have
indepth knowledge of the contents of the Should Cost report. For this
reason, the team leader is traditionally the chief negotiator [14:8-23, 24].
This detailed knowledge should provide the chief negotiator with an "more-
than-usual" amount of confidence in the strenght of his position, enabling
him to bargain more effectively [14:8-24].
Once the negotiator is fully prepared to negotiate, a realistic
time schedule for negotiations should be formulated and adhered to. A
negotiator must recognize that he is in an adversarial role with the
contractor during negotiations and must be prepared to use all possible and
available tactics at his disposal. The chief negotiator must use imagi-
nation and be flexible with his position at anytime, but never cross the
line into the unethical. [33s 29]
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V. SHOULD COST ANALYSES ISSUES
(SHOULD COST LEGISLATION)
A. INTRODUCTION
The language of the Should Cost legislation clearly delinates the
desires of the Congress. The researcher believes that this legislation
is intended to provide DoD managers with accurate cost estimates of what
production should cost, prior to awarding a contract. Apparently, Congress
had determined that the DoD had ineffective methods of obtaining good
program cost estimates, and it was now time to legislate a method.
Through annual reports from the Secretary of Defense, the Congress will
have oversight of the extent Should Cost analyses are being used in the
DoD.
Although the requirements of the legislation for the Secretary of
Defense are clear, the implied effects of the Should Cost legislation on
the military services deserves further examination. Through an analysis
of the Should Cost legislation, a determination can be made of scope and
the flowdown requirements of the legislation on the services.
1. Approaches to Should Cost
Two common approaches to Should Cost analyses were found to exist
in the Government by the researcher. These are, selective Should Cost
studies, and classical Should Cost analyses,
a. Selective Should Cost Studies
A selective Should Cost study is an indepth analysis of
specific resources required for contract performance to ensure the achieve-
ment of reasonable efficiency. This approach, often referred to as the
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"mini-team" approach, is utilized in recognition of the limited pool of
personnel available in Government buying commands with the proper skills
for Should Cost analyses [17:5-2]. A selective Should Cost study is
generally based on a detailed analysis of performance related efforts by
Government specialists and may include development of drawing-based esti-
mates of manufacturing labor, determination of adequate levels of support
labor, independent estimation or validation of material costs, and evalua-
tion of proposed contractor labor rates and indirect costs. A selective
Government analysis may vary in scope from an evaluation of multiple
resources in every phase of the procurement to a limited assessment of a
specific resource in one facet of the proposed contract's requirements.
[23:4]
From these studies, cost recommendations, for those areas
examined, can be utilized as input to the overall cost target of the
contract by the negotiator.
b. Classical Should Cost Analyses
A classical Should Cost analysis is a comprehensive, indepth
analysis which is developed from an examination and evaluation of all
phases of a proposed contractor's operation. This is done by a team of
specialists in disciplines including engineering, pricing, audit, and
plant facilities. The primary objective is to identify instances of
omission or commission in the management and performance of planned or
existing work which could compromise attainment of realistic schedule,
performance, and cost objectives* A realistic price is one that is based
on what it should cost if the contractor operates with reasonable economy
and efficiency. The team's secondary objective is to provide the
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contractor with recommendations as to how to remedy the identified
inefficient and uneconomical conditions. [23:5]
B. IMPACT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
The two approaches to Should Cost analysis differ significantly in
their scope and effort needed to complete the analysis. It is important
to recognize if Congress had an intended approach to Should Cost analysis
when writing the Should Cost legislation. The researcher believes that
if the intended approach was that of the selective Should Cost study, the
impact of the legislation should be of less consequence to the Army of
the Air Force because these two services have procedures and organizations
in place to conduct this type of analysis. However, the Navy would be
affected much more. Due to the de-emphasis on the usage of Should Cost
analyses in the Navy [21:2-3]» the researcher believes that the experi-
enced knowledge base of Should Cost analysis is minimimal and that the
necessary organizational structures to coordinate and orchestrate Should
Cost analyses service-wide are non-existant. Therefore, the Navy would
have to reorientate its philosophy of Should Cost analyses, and create
the appropriate knowledge base and organization to support Should Cost
analysis efforts. However, each service would be affected by the lack
of skilled personnel to support the effort, according to DoD officials
interviewed
.
The researcher feels that if the Congressional intended approach to
Should Cost analysis is that described by the "classical" Should Cost
approach, then the impact of the legislation will be substantial on each
service. DoD officials interviewed said that the lack of skilled per-
sonnel resources to satisfy the current requirements for cost analysis,
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traditional or "should cost", is the major problem that needs to be
addressed and solved. Should Cost analysis efforts, particularly the
classical approach, are extremely labor intensive and would require many
more personnel than are currently available.
Research indicates that a classical Should Cost analysis of a major
weapons system has yet to be performed by any branch of service
.
G. CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT
The Dod Authorization Act, 1986 Conference Report provided as descrip-
tion of Should Cost analysis made by Congress. In the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference of the DoD Authorization Act,
Should Cost analyses were described in the following manner [12:4531s
Should-cost analyses are a technique used to evaluate ongoing production
programs by sending in a government team to evaluate the contractor and
to identify inefficiencies in the contractor's management and operation.
D. OTHER GUIDANCE
1. FAR
The FAR included the contracting officer's judgement of deciding
which elements of the contractor's operation have the greatest potential
for cost savings and assign the available personnel resources accordingly
[19:15-391. It would appear to the researcher that the availability of
personnel is the determining factor in the depth of the Should Cost
analysis. DoD and industry officials interviewed said that there are
inadequate levels of skilled personnel in the Government to effectively
support wide scale Should Cost analyses.
2. Service Guidance
Governing instructions for Should Cost analysis of the services
emphasize selective utilization of this technique for procurement and
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contractor's costs elements where the probability of benefit accruing
to the Government is high. [23: 12; 22:2; 1?: 1-1]
S. ANALYSIS OF SHOULD COST LEGISLATION
1. Report to Congress
Paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Should Cost analyses legislation
(see Appendix A) delinate the reporting requirements for the Secretary
of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is required to submit an annual
report of his plan to perform Should Cost analyses on major defense
acquisition programs for the next fiscal year to Congress. This report
will be submitted to the Armed Service Committees in the Senate and the
House of Representatives not later than 15 January or the date of budget
submission for the next fiscal year. The report will cover one fiscal
year but will be submitted eight and a half months prior to the start of
the covered fiscal year. [12:110-111]
The report submitted to Congress from the Secretary of Defense
will identify all major defense acquisitions. These acquisitions will be
segregated into three broad categories. These categories are:
-"covered systems" planned for a Should Cost analysis;
-"covered systems" not planned for a Should Cost analysis, and in each
case, the justifications for not planning such an analysis;
-major defense systems not determined to be "covered systems" and the
reasons for that determination.
The researcher fails to understand the necessity for the amount of infor-
mation to be included in the annual report to the Congress. As can be
seen from the text of the Should Cost amendment contained in Appendix A,
Congress specifically delinated the criteria for a major defense system to
be considered a "covered system". The requirement to identify major
60
defense systems that clearly do not meet the criteria listed for a
"covered system", makes the stated use of this information questionable.
The only explanation that the researcher can offer is that Congress desires
a source of information that will annually present all of the major defense
programs.
The timing of the presentation of the "Annual Should Cost Report"
to Congress deserves further examination. One of the objectives of the
Congressional conferees when fashioning the language of the Should Cost
legislation was to have adequate oversight of the use of Should Cost
analyses in the DoD [12:^53] • This oversight role could have been either
a proactive one or a reactive one, Congress obviously chose a proactive
role. In this role, one must be concerned with the action that Congress
may take in the event there is disagreement with the "Annual Should Cost
Report" submitted by the Secretary of Defense and the members of Congress.
Although any answer on this matter would totally be conjecture at this
point, the researcher feels that this question is worthy of consideration
by the DoD. Additionally, while in this proactive role, Congress does
not have the visibility of the results of the legislated Should Cost
analyses. The researcher feels that this information would be of vital
importance to Congress in assessing the effectiveness and economy of the
Should Cost legislation. Also, the researcher feels that a report of
post-should cost efforts and the savings achieved by the DoD, to Congress,
could assist in the budgeting process as well. However, as the legislation
is written, it appears to the researcher that Congress does not desire
any feedback on the effectiveness the Should Cost legislation.
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The issues raised by the researcher are pertinent areas for further
examination. Until these areas are addressed, the actual intent of Congress
with the Should Cost legislation must be questioned.
2. Covered Systems
Paragraph (b) of the Should Cost legislation (Appendix A) describes
the criteria that determines whether a major defense acquisition is covered
by the legislation.
The researcher feels that the most pertinent criteria for major
defense systems (is; "a production contract for the system is to be awarded
during the year following the next fiscal year using procedures other than
full and open" [12:110]. The listed criteria for a "covered system"
covers a wide range of major defense systems . There is no distinction
between those systems which are considered well managed and have controlled
costs, and those which are documented laden with inefficiencies and un-
economical.
The researcher speculates that perhaps one of the reasons that
Congress wrote the amendment to cover a wide array of major systems, is
its desire for sweeping cost savings in these acquisitions. Afterall,
the benefits and cost savings that resulted from past Should Cost analyses
were substantial and well documented. DoD officials interviewed commented
that in those instances where Should Cost analyses were used, the programs
were already identified as having excessive cost growth and being inef-
ficient. Consequently, when analyses were performed on these programs,
substantial cost savings resulted for the Government. The expectation
of similar cost savings over all defense systems should be resisted.
The Should Cost legislation would consider all programs as Should
Cost candidates, including those that have costs below the initial estimates
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or have shown no problems with being efficient or controlling costs.
Unless those programs with cost problems or suspected efficiency problems
are identified and targeted by the Congress as Should Cost candidates,
the researcher believes that the "shotgun" approach being pursued by
Congress will be costly and ineffective.
Other systems that are subject to the Should Cost legislation
are those being contracted under multi-year and second sourcing acquisition
methodologies
.
Multi year procurement is a method of contracting for mature
systems such that multiple year requirements are contracted at one time
[38s-5-39]» This method is designed to lower the cost of the acquisition
by making the process more stable than it would have been if requirements
were contracted on an annual basis . Multi year contract! ng allows the
contractor to take advantage of economic production rates and quantity
purchases from it's suppliers. The cost savings achieved by the contractor,
because of this more stable long term contract, are passed on to be con-
tracted as a multiyear contract, the program is reviewed and evaluated
for stability and approved by Congress [38$ 5-39* ^0\ . Performing a
Should Cost analysis on multi year programs is believed by the researcher
to be a costly endeavor with an inadequate payback to the Government.
These programs (multiyear) have been reviewed and evaluated for cost
control and effective management and are subject to constant scrutiny
by the contractor and the Government.
Similar to multiyear contracting, programs acquired using second
sourcing methodologies are also subject ot Should Cost analyses. Two
second sourcing methods in particular, contractor teaming and leader
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follower, would be grossly misrepresented in a Should Cost analysis in
the researcher's opinion. These methods of second sourcing, cause the
first several production lots to he costly and inefficient. The benefits
to the Government of these methods are realized later when future require-
ments are competed between the sources and the forces of competition
influences the contractor to be less costly and more efficient. [38:5-3]
The benefits of a Should Cost analysis on these types of acquisi-
tions would be substantially less than if applied to other contracts and
an unnecessary expense, in the researcher opinion.
3. Definition
The term "major defense acquisition program" has the meaning
given such term in section 139a(a)(l) of title 10, United States Code
[39:137-138] • This section is presented in Appendix G. It should be
recognized that the definition of "major defense acquisition system" is
substantially different from that of "major acquisition system" . The
Should Cost legislation is only applicable to defense programs and not
general major systems. The definition of "major system" was added to the
United States Code by an amendment to Chapter 13? of Title 10, in the FY 85
DoD Authorization Act [10:103]. Appendix D is an exerpt of this amendment
defining the term "major systems".
4. Effective Date
Paragraph (e) of the Should Cost Legislation identifies when the
legislation will take effect. This paragraph states [l2:llllj "This
section shall apply to covered systems for which initial production funds
are first appropiated for a fiscal year after fiscal year 1986". The
field of initial candidates to be considered for Should Cost analyses is
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more restricted than just those programs meeting the criteria listed under
"covered systems" . The earliest that a program could be considered for
a Should Cost analysis in accordance with the legislation is fiscal year
1988, and the program must have had initial production funds first appro-
priated for fiscal year 1987. As currently written, the Should Cost
legislation would not effect any program that has gone through initial
production prior to fiscal year 87, which limits the affected programs
to new production programs.
The researcher believes that initially targeting only the new
production programs will not take full advantage of the cost savings that
could be achieved through the Should Cost legislation. It is believed
that there are plenty of established programs that could provide substantial
cost savings if they received a Should Cost analysis. In an era when
defense acquisition is scrutinized at all levels, the researcher is of
the opinion that newer programs are receiving the proper management, cost
control, and efficiency emphasis, and would not yield the Should Cost
benefits that are available in some current programs.
F. SUMMARY
The key aspects of the researcher's analysis of the Should Cost
legislation are:
-Congressional emphasis appears to be on the number of major programs
being awarded production contracts, not the results of the Should
Cost analyses mandated by the legislation.
-"Good", cost efficient programs and programs under special cost
saving contract methodologies are not exempt.
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-The achievable benefits from Should Cost analyses must be understood,
if not, they will be misleading.
-Only new programs with initial production after FY 8? are affected,
hut none of the existing known costly programs are affected by the
legislation.
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IV. OTHER SHDUTD COST ISSUES
This chapter will identify and examine several current issues that
were considered key management issues of Should Cost analysis by personnel
interviewed.
A. ISSUE #1: NECESSITY OF PROPOSAL PRIOR TO SHOULD COST EFFORT
Several DoD officials indicated that a Should Cost analysis can not
be performed without a contractor's proposal. The contractor's proposal
sets the baseline of comparison for the Should Cost team. An issue raised
by a Government official is whether it is necessary to have a proposal to
analyze follow-on production operations of the contractor?
The contractor's proposal provides the Government certified cost or
pricing data which aids the Should Cost team structure its analysis. The
Truth in Negotiations Act, Public Law 87-653 directs the Government to
obtain certified cost data on all contracts over $100,000 [40:383]. This
certified data is submitted to the Government with the contractor's pro-
posal. An analysis of the contractor's proposal and the certified pricing
data by the buying activity formulates the baseline of costs and the
depth of the proposed Should Cost analysis [23:12]. However, this certified
cost data may be changed and/or updated by the contractor at anytime up
to the date of agreement on price [40:3B4], Given this type of flexibility
with the finality of certified cost data, the researcher feels the advan-
tage of having this data prior to a Should Cost analysis is minimimal.
Several key pieces of information must be available to the Government
to allow the performance of a Should Cost analysis without the benefit of
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a proposal. The researcher has identified six basic questions that should
be answered before a Should Cost analysis can be performed. These ques-
tions are:
-What product is required and in what quantity?
-Who can provide the product?
-What is the level of competition?
-What manufacturing process will be employed?
-How stable and defined is the program?
-How many resources are required to produce the product?
It is believed by the researcher that a contractor's proposal is not
necessary to conduct a Should Cost analysis. Information needed to answer
the six questions above is available to the Government prior to solicita-
tion and the receipt of a proposal. The majority of this needed information
is contained in the Program Manager's Acquisition Strategy.
An acquisition strategy is the conceptual basis of the overall plan
that a program manager follows in program execution to obtain a new weapon
system to satisfy an approved mission need. It serves as the baseline
for preparing the plans and activities to accomplish the program [38: 3- 111 •
The acquisition strategy serves as a road map for program planning and
execution.
By the Full Scale Development phase of the acquisition process, the
product(s) required and respective quantities needed to satisfy a mission
objective are identified. The product is developed and tested according
to the refined acquisition strategy. Strategy decisions concerning who
will provide the .product(s) and the level of competition to be provided
in acquiring the product(s) are known prior to beginning the Production
and Deployment phase of the acquisition process.
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From the acquisition strategy, the questions of what is required,
the quantity, and the degree of competition planned for the product can
be obtained.
Information to answer the remaining three questions becomes available
shortly after the initial production of the product is completed. The
methods employed in the initial production stage are the processes to be
used for full scale and follow-on production. The data obtained from
the initial production stage will allow the Government to determine the
amount of resources that would be needed to produce future requirements
if produced in the same manner. Also, by the end of the initial produc-
tion stage the Government will be in the position to evaluate the stability
and definition of the program.
The identification of the needed product, the quantities needed, the
contractor who will provide the product and the level of competition is
available through the refined acquisition strategy beginning at the Full
Scale Development phase of the acquisition process. The methods of manu-
facture and the costs associated with those methods to produce the product
in full scale production are known shortly after the initial production
phase . The early availability of this data is the reason the researcher
believes that a contractor proposal is not necessary to conduct a Should
Gost analysis, Determining what a product "should-cost" is a process
that should be independent of a contractor's proposed cost.
Conducting a Should Gost analysis on the known sole source contractor
for a known anticipated quantity prior to beginning the acquisition time-
table for a follow-on contract, provides the Government more time to
conduct the analysis. It would then be possible to perform a series of
time-phased "mini" Should Gost analyses on the various cost elements
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involved to produce the product. This approach of several small teams,
as opposed to one massive team performing a concentrated effort, is believed
to be less disruptive to the contractor and removes the time constraints
traditionally imposed on a Should Cost team.
However, the FAR 15»810(c) states that the contracting officer should
indicate in the solicitation when a Should Gost analysis is planned for
the contract. Although not a mandatory provision, its inclusiton in the
FAR as guidance must be recognized.
B. ISSUE #2: OBTAINING RESOURCES
DoD and industry personnel interviewed stated that there is a lack of
skilled personnel in the Government to effectively support Should Gost
analyses on major defense systems. It is generally agreed that more per-
sonnel trained in the skills necessary for effective Should Gost analyses
are needed to accomplish the requirements of the Should Gost legislation.
The researcher submits several methods for the Government to acquire and/
or enhance the skills needed to conduct Should Gost analyses.
1. Request Additional Funding for Needed Personnel
The DoD could request additional funding to acquire personnel
that have those skills which are vital to performing Should Gost analyses.
It may be possible for the DoD to capitalize on the passage of the Should
Gost amendment and the wide support for procurement reform by identifying
possible savings which are achievable if the needed addition personnel are
obtained. A request for these additional personnel may be viewed favorably




Personnel who have participated on Should Cost teams are an in-
valuable source of experience for future Should Cost efforts. There is
no substitute for experience and knowledge gained through actual parti-
cipation. These personnel should be the management nucleus for conducting
future Should Cost analyses and training future Should Cost team members.
[17:9-1]
The working conditions for conducting a Should Cost analysis,
and often the lack of recognition for the team member's efforts during
the analysis, provide little incentive for personnel to participate in
future efforts. The long periods away from families, long working hours
and other less than desirable attributes of Should Cost analysis for
team members often extinguishes the desire of members to become involved
in Should Cost analyses again. The lack of participation in these efforts
limits the pool of personnel qualified to participate in future analyses.
Attention must be given to methods that will make participation as a
Should Cost team member beneficial to the individual. Two methods recom-
mended by the researcher that could start enhancing the participation on
a Should Cost team are:
-public recognition of efforts by a senior procurement official through
letters of appreciation/commendation or other awards;
-making participation on a Should Cost team, at varying levels, a
prerequisite for future position/salary advancements.
Maintaining experienced personnel interested in future Should
Cost analysis efforts is instrumental in having a core of knowledge to
train others. It is through this process of the core base training the
unskilled and having the unskilled become skilled and experienced by




Another alternative for the acquisition of properly skilled
personnel resources to conduct effective Should Cost analyses is to
contract out for these services. The researcher considers this alterna-
tive feasible only as a short term solution or to acquire for unique
skills.
4. Formal Training
A Government sponsored formal training program could be initiated
to train personnel in the skills needed in Should Cost analyses. A cen-
tralized source of training could provide in addition to skilled analysts,
a standardized procedure to conducting a Should Cost analysis. The Naval
Space and Warfare Command has a course titled An Introduction To Direct
Cost Analysis , that covers many of the skills required to conduct a Should
Cost analysis. The Army offers a Should-Cost Analysis Workshop to give
team members a broad overview of Should Cost analysis and analytical
techniques. Courses similar to these should be offered by all buying
commands
.
C. ISSUE #3: ORGANIZATIONS FOR SHOULD COST ANALYSES IN MAJOR DEFENSE
SYSTEMS ENVIRONMENT
DoD acquisition officials interviewed revealed that a challenging
management issue is, how will the DoD best be able to perform Should
Cost analyses on major defense systems. As a result of conversations
with several DoD acquisition officials, the researcher offers several
organization structures that are believed to be capable of performing
effective Should Cost analyses in the major defense systems environment.
1. Individual Buying Commands
Each Government official interviewed agreed that the individual
buying commands should have the skills and necessary quantities of
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personnel to conduct simple "selective should cost studies". This
approach to Should Cost analysis isolate particular cost drivers of a
contract and apply the Should Cost concept of anlysis to these areas.
However, the analysis efforts should be limited to components, subsystems
or simple major systems due to the limited availability of needed skills
at the individual buying commands.
2. Centralized Should Cost Organizations
For analyzing complex major defense systems, the researcher
feels that a more centralized organization structure that has a large
pool of resources to devote to the effort is necessary. A coordinated
orchestration of Should Cost analyses in major defese systems is needed
to provide all of the elements (e.g. skills, manpower, money, direction,
support, etc) that are necessary for a successful analysis. This objec-
tive is believed achievable by organizing a centralized Should Cost Office
in each military service or a seperate organizational body that would
represent all military services.
The rationale for the researcher suggesting a centralized approach
to major systems Should Cost analyses is that this approach would:
-increase the availability of skilled personnel by including either
the assets of the entire service or the assets of the entire DoD
as a pool of talent, vice being limited to what is available to
through the buying agency
-reduce duplication of efforts;
-allow standardization and coordination of the process;
-create a centralized core of "experts"
a. Centralized by Service
Under this type of organization, each military service would
establish a central Should Cost office. This office would coordinate all
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Should Cost analyses for its service, set policies and procedures for
conducting Should Cost analyses, he a repository for all Should Cost
reports/lesson learned written by the service, and be that service's
core of knowledge for Should Cost analysis. Organizing a Should Cost
office on the service level also increases the pool of available skilled
resources from that of an individual buying agency to all buying agencies
in that service. This organization would be supplemented by buying
activity personnel when planning and conducting Should Cost analyses.
To further reduce duplication and expand the size of the personnel
pool, each service could act as the .lead agency to conduct Should Cost
analyses for other services. Similar to the lead agency concept used in
negotiating ceilings for independent research and development (IR&D)
with contractors, or administering the Cost Schedule Control System
Criteria (C/SCSC), the service with the preponderance of business at a
contractor's facility would be the lead agency for Should Cost analyses
for other service's programs at the facility. The buying service would be
heavily involved in planning the analysis with the lead agency and provide
additional personnel for the analysis. This "lead agency" approach further
broadens the pool of resources to include cross service support, and
limits duplication of effort between services.
b. Centralized DoD Should Cost Organization
A Should Cost organization at the DoD level is another method
of centralizing the effort to conduct Should Cost analyses on complex
major defense systems. This organization would be staffed with highly
talented personnel skilled in all areas of Should Cost analysis. These
personnel could provide the "core" Should Cost team which is supplemented
by personnel from the buying activity during the analysis. In this manner,
the Government would have a centralized group of "experts" that provides
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to the buying organizations to maintain a base of skills in these
organizations. Maximum control, coordination and utilization of resources
during an analysis are achieved.
The DoD Should Cost organization and the centralised service
Should Cost organization are designed to:
-increase the pool of available qualified personnel to be on a Should
Cost team;
-provide unified policy, procedures, and guidance;
-serve as a centralized repository of "core" knowledge, Should Cost
reports and Should Cost Lessons Learned;
-reduce duplication of Should Cost effort;
-provide a source of training to buying activities;
-bring top level DoD interest in the Should Cost process
D. ISSUE #4: MOTIVATING THE CONTRACTOR
The entire Should Cost analysis concept would be an ineffective method
of long term cost control/avoidance if the contractor does not make the
changes recommended by the Should Cost team. The researcher was unable
to find any provision that made a contractor legally bound to implement
a Should Cost team's recommendations. It would be argued that the Govern-
ment should pay only the "should cost" amount and all incurred costs over
this amount would be borne by the contractor. Several DoD officials
interviewed said that although this seem to be a good way to motivate
contractors to control costs, having contractors take excessive costs
from profits is not likely to happen. To make Should Cost analyses an
effective method of cost control, the Goverment must be able to influence
the contractor to adopt the Should Cost team's recommendations.
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1. Preponderance of Government Business
The researcher feels that one reason the interviewed contractors
did not express an antagonistic attitude about the Government entering their
facility and conducting a Should Cost analysis was that the majority of
their business was Government business. In these instances, the contractor
respected the leverage that the Government had over them and this leverage
helped influence the contractor's attitude of Should Cost analyses.
Preponderance of Government business is a characteristic that is mentioned
only as a "secondary" consideration for selecting Should Cost candidates
[14:2-3]. The researcher feels that this characteristic should be included
as a Go/No Go consideration when evaluating Should Cost candidates.
Contractors who are reliant on Government contracts to remain in business
have more to risk by not implementing Should Cost recommendations than
those contractor's with a substantial commercial business base.
2. Negotiable Contract Provisions/lncentivization
The inclusion of the Should Cost teamjs recommendations as nego-
tiable elements of the contract could possibly influence the contractor
to comply with the recommendations. This method would make the contractor
contractually liable for those recommendations agreed to in negotiations.
Utilizing a profit incentive arrangement, where the contractor
shares in the savings/cost avoidances achieved from implementing efficiency
enhancing recommendations, could also be used to influence the contractor.
This incentive arrangement could be implemented alone or in combination
with other methods.
3. Weighted Guidelines
Another method of motivating contractors to implement the Should
Cost team's recommendations is the inclusion of Should Cost analysis as
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an element for the weighted guidelines profit consideration [14:8-17] •
This element could be rated such that the more recent the Should Cost
analysis the contractor has had, or in recognition of the contractor's
improvement efforts, the higher the weight.
B. ISSUE #6: WHO SHOULD SHOULD COST WHO?
In major systems acquisitions, the trend had been for the prime
contractor to serve primarily as a systems integrator for many sub-contrac-
tors. On large, complex systems, the prime/sub-contractor relationships
could be in the hundreds.
Due to these large numbers of relationships, the researcher feels
that critical decisions must be made concerning who will receive a Should
Cost analysis in order for the Government to receive the maximum benefit
with the limited resources available. The researcher will identify and
examine several approaches to conducting Should Cost analyses on major
defense programs with many subcontractors.
1. Government Conducts All Analyses
Reducing the costs of inefficiency in the contractual relationship
between the Government and the prime contractor is the primary purpose of
Should Cost analysis. Therefore, one would think that the prime should
be the main target of the Should Cost analysis. However, in an environment
where the prime contractor directly contributes only a small portion to
the total costs of a contract, the analysis should extend to the sub-
contractor tier to be effective. The question to consider is, how to
perform Should Cost analyses at the sub-contractor tier?
One approach to performing Should Cost analyses on the sub-
contractor tier is to have the Government perform the analyses. With
the multitude of sub-contractors involved with major systems acquisitions,
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the Government would have to approach these analyses on a selective basis.
The criteria recommended by the researcher to select which sub-contractors
to analyze should be the same as that applied when determining which prime
to analyze. These criteria are:
-contracted under less than full and open competition;
-some production history exists;
-no major changes expected in product provided;
-contractor's product is sufficiently defined to allow an analysis.
There are two main drawbacks of this approach. The first draw-
back is that the number of skilled personnel required by the Government
to perform Should Cost analysis at the sub-contractor tier is extensive
.
The other drawback to the Government performing Should Cost analyses
on sub-contractors is that usually "privity of contract" does not exist
between the Government and the prime contractor's sub-contractors. Privity
of contract occurs only if the subcontractor is an agent of the Government
[41:909]. The prime contractor is an agent of the Government, not his
sub-contractors. Sub-contractors are agents of the prime contractor.
Unless the sub-contractor becomes an agent of the Government, or the
prime includes provisions in the contracts with the sub-contractors which
allow the Government to perform these analyses on the sub-contractors, the
Government does not have the right to perform Should Cost analyses at
the sub-contractor level.
2. Prime Contractor Performs Analyses on Subcontractors
As an alternative to the Government performing Should Cost
analyses on sub-contractors, the prime contractor could be tasked with
performing these analyses. This would eliminate the privity of contract
issue between the sub-contractors and the Government, and the problem of
insufficient Government personnel to analyze the sub-contractor tier.
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Interviews revealed that contractors are no better equipped to
perform Should Cost analyses than tte Government. Lacking the needed
in-house resources to perform these analyses, an alternative for the
contractor could be to hire consultants to perform these Should Gost
analyses. Regardless whether the contractor uses in-house personnel or
consultants, the cost to the Government for these services would be high.
Research has also revealed that sub-contractors would adamantly
resist the prime contractor conducting a Should Cost analysis on their
operation. Although sub-contractors are agents of the prime, they are
also competitors of the prime. An example of their competition is the
prime contractor's make or buy decisions. Products received from sub-
contractors are constantly evaluated by the prime contractor to determine
whether it is cheaper to make the product themselves or continue buying
from a sub-contractor. Sub-contractors consider the data needed to
conduct a Should Gost analysis as propietary data and would not submit
it to a potential competitor.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
AND AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
<
A. AFPROACH TO SHOULD COST ANALYSES KEY TO IMPACT
A strict interpretation of the FAR's description of Should Cost analyses
to that of the "classical ,, approach would have the most impact on the services
ability to perform Should Cost analyses. The needed personnel resources
are not available in DoD, the necessary coordination and control organi-
zation structures does not exist and there is not evidence that a "classical"
approach to Should Cost analyses has ever been accomplished on a complex
major defense system.
Congressional conferees stated that the Should Cost legislation was
written to allow the DoD utilize its resources where they will provide
the most significant return [12:453] • Emphasizing a particular, standard
approach such as the "classical" approach to Should Cost analyses, would
not allow the DoD to effectively use its resources.
Should Cost analysis is a concept that has as a goal, the ability to
determine what a product should cost if it is produced with reasonable
efficiency. The concept is built on a customer's ability to analyze its
suppliers operation and data, then project the cost for a product based
on efficient operations.
Several approaches to Should Cost analyses are utilized by Government
agencies that oan yield efficiency based costs. These different approaches
attempt to gain the greates benefit to the Government at the minimum cost.
Military buying organizations currently have the flexibility to select
which acquisitions to anlyze, which elements to study, and what size team
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will be necessary to conduct the analysis. The objective is to select
a contractor, elements and team size that has the greatest potential of
yielding significant savings to the Government as a result of the analysis.
The researcher recommends that each military service be allowed to
define its own approach to Should Cost analysis, as long as the approach
supports the process described in the FAR. Should Cost is a concept, not
a technique or particular approach. What is important is that the approach
used results in a price that is based on what it should cost in the
environment and under the conditions of efficiency for the performance
of the contract.
B. CENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION NEEDED FOR SHOULD COST IN MAJOR SYSTEMS
Unlike the Should Cost analyses of the past which were primarily
performed on components and subsystems, Should Cost analyses of major
defense systems will involve large, eextremely complex integrated systems.
Previous Should Cost analyses couldbe completed organized and orchestrated
by individual buying activities with in-house resources and limited
augmentation from other commands. Should Cost analyses of major defense
systems will involve a broad scope of areas and relationships for analysis.
Complex systems must be understood just as the complex organizations of
the prime contractor and sub-contractors must be understood, to effectively
conduct Should Cost analyses in the major systems environment.
To accomplish wide scale Should Cost analyses on major defense systems,
the simple decentralized organizations of past Should Cost efforts will
not suffice . The research recommends the establishment of an organization
structure comensurate with the complexity and magnitude of the analysis
.
This organization should be structured such that it:
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-minimizes duplication of effort on the inter and intra-service level;
-maximizes resources;
-is highly visable and is supported at the highest level of DoD;
-has the authority to acquire needed resources;
-can set standardized policy and procedure (not approach) to Should
Cost analyses;
-is a central repository for "core" teams, reports and lessons learned;
-is supplemented by buying organizations during analyses to constantly
expand the pool of experienced personnel in these organizations.
The researcher feels that a centralized Should Cost organization, with the
elements listed above, would allow DoD to perform effective and efficient
Should Cost analyses on major systems.
G. POTENTIAL PROBLEM OF SHOULD COST ANALYSES AT SUBCONTRACTOR TIER
Prime contractors of many major defense systems are primarily systems
integrators and directly contribute only a small percentage to the overall
cost of the system. The majority of costs are contributed by the many
sub-contractors of the prime contractor. To be an effective method of
controlling and cutting costs of a major system, the application of Should
Cost analysis can not be limited only to the prime contractor. A review
of sub-contractors operations and efficiency costing the product that is
provided to the prime contractor is needed to achieve the maximum benefit
of a Should Cost analysis on a major system.
Either the Government or the prime contractor could analyze the
sub-contractor tier of prime major defense system contract. The problem
that exist are:
-No privity of contract between the sub-contractors and the Government
-Sub-contractors consider data needed for Should Cost analysis by the
prime contractor as proprietary and will resist submission.
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-Neither Government or prime contractor adequately staffed to analyze
sub-contractor tier.
The researcher feels that this problem can best be solved by the
Government creating a contractual relationship with the sub-contractor
tier and selectively conducting Should Cost analyses on the sub-contractors.
The effort could be planned and coordinated by the central Should Cost
office and buying organizations could be tasked to selectively analyze
the sub-contractor tier.
D. MOTIVATING CONTRACTOR ESSENTIAL TO SHOULD COST CONCEPT
Long term benefits to be gained from a Should Cost analysis are con-
gent upon the contractor implementing the recommendations of the Should
Cost team. The long term improvement recommendations may require substantial
changes in the contractor's organization and operations. Unless special
provisions are added to the contract, contractors are not obligated to
implement the Should Cost team's recommendations.
The Government must explore ways to induce the contractor to implement
Should Cost recommendations. One such method recommended by the researcher
is offering the contractor additional compensation through an incentive
contract arrangement. The contractor would be more motivated to implement
Should Cost recommendations if he was to receive a percentage of the cost
savings that resulted from implementing these recommendations
.
E. AREAS OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Several areas of Should Cost analyses were uncovered while researching
the topic that were beyond the scope of this paper but deserved additional
investigation . Areas recommended as follow-on thesis topics or research
topics are:
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-Determine the ideal training/experience profile for personnel involved
in Should Cost analyses. Also investigate methods to retain personnel
in the area of Should Cost analysis.
-Applications of Should Cost analyses in the competitive environment.
-Strengthening the contract administration organization to have a
more direct role in Should Cost analyses.
-Study of past Should Cost analysis reports and determine if long




SEC. 915. SHOULD-COST ANALYSES
(a) Report on Annual Plan.- The Secretary of Defense shall
submit to Congress an annual report setting forth the
Secretary's plan for the performance during the next
fiscal year of cost analyses for major defense
acquisition programs for the purpose of determining
how much the production of covered systems under such
programs should cost. The report shall describe -
(1) which covered systems the Secretary plans to
apply such an analysis to;
(2) which covered systems the Secretary does not plan
to apply such an analysis to and, in each such
case, the reasons for not applying such an
ana 1 ys i s » and
(3) which systems were determined not to be covered
systems under a major defense acquisition program
and the reasons -for that determination.
(b) Covered Systems.- For the purposes of subsection (a),
a system under a major defense acquisition program
shall be considered to be a covered system if-
(1) a production contract for the system is to be
awarded during the year following the next fiscal
year using procedures other than full and open
cornpet i t i on ;
(2) initial production of the system has already taken
p 1 ace;
(3) the current plans for the Department of Defense
include production of substantial quantities of
identical or similar items in fiscal years beyond
the next fiscal year;
(4) the work to be performed under the contract is
sufficiently defined to permit an effective
analysis of what production of the system by the
contractor should cost; and
(5) major changes in the program are unlikely.
(c) Submittal of Report.- The report required by
subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives not. later than the date on which the
budget for the next fiscal year is submitted each
year
.
(d) Definition.- The term "major defense acquisition
program" has the meaning given such term in section
139a(a)(l> of title 10, United States Code.
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(e) Effective Date.- This section apply to covered
systems -for which initial production -funds are -first
appropriated -for a fiscal year after fiscal year
1986.
Source: U.S., Congress, The Committee of Conference,
Department of D ef ense Authorization Act., 1936, 0n
S. 1160, 99th Cong., 1st sess. , 1995.
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APPENDIX B
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING CANDIDATES
The -following general standards apply when selecting
candidates for Should Cost review:
a. In selecting a candidate -for a Should Cost study, the
primary consideration should be the likihood of achieving a
successful outcome. The most detailed and complete Should
Cost analysis is of little benefit, if its results cannot be
negotiated. For this reason, certain factors that are not
directly related to the Should Cost review itself should be
investigated carefully before selecting a candidate. The
Government contract negotiator, in order to reach the
Govrnment s goals, must have bargaining strength at least
equal to the contractor. For this reason, the following
factors should be considered before selecting a contractor:
(1) Is it absolutely imperative that the hardware or
services be acquired at once°
(2) Is the candidate truly the sole source of hardware or
services or could they be purchased from another source?
(3) If necessary, can the conttracting officer make a
unilateral price determination (for example, under a letter
contract )
?
(4) Are other acquisitions pending on which the candidate
is bidding in competition with others?
(5) How much future Department of Defense business can
the contractor be expected to acquire?
(6) How strongly does the contractor value its reputation
with the Government and with the public?
(7) Is the contractor's plant full, or is there idle
p 1 ant space
(3) How has the contractor responded in the past to
recommended improvements
b. The answers to questions in < 1 ) through (3) above should
help provide the basis for determining whether the contractor
should be selected, regardless of other considerations.
Source: Department of the Air Force, Shou 1 d C ost . AFP
70-5, September 19 ?
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APPENDIX C
DEFINITION of -MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAM-
SECTION I3?a(a) (1) of TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
139a. Oversight of cost growth in major programs: Selected
Acquisition Reports
(a) In this section:
(1) "Major defense acquisition program" means a Department
of Defense acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive
classified program (as determined by the Secretary of
Def ense ) and
-
(A) that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as a
major defense acquisition program; or
(B) that is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to
require ar» eventual total expenditure for research,
development, test, and evaluation of more than $200, 000, 000
(based on fiscal year 1980 constant dollars) or an eventual
total expenditure for procurement of more than *1 , 000, 000 , 000
(based on fiscal year 1980 constant dollars).
Source: United States Government Printing Office,




DEFINTION of "MAJOR SYSTEM"
Part B-AMEMDMENTS TO CHAPTER 137 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES
CODE
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 1211. Section 2302 of title 10, United States Cose, is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraph ( s ) :
"(5) 'Major system* means a combination of elements that will
function together to produce the capacilities required to
fulfill a mission need. The elements may include hardware,
equipment, software or any combination thereof, but excludes
construction or other improvements to real property. A
system shall be considered a major system if (A) the
Department of Defense is responsible for the system and the
total expenditures for reasearch, development, test and
evaluation for the system ar e estiimated to be more than
$"75", 000, 000 (based on fiscal year 19S0 constant dollars) or
the eventual total expenditure for procurement of more than
$300,000,000 (based on fiscal year 19S0 constant dollars);
(B) a civilian agency is responsible for the system and total
expenditures for rthe system are estimated to exceed $750,000
(based on fiscal year 19S0 constant dollars) or the dollar
threshold for a 'major system' established by the agency
pursuant to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-109, entitled 'Major Systems Acquisitions', whichever is
greater; or (CI the system is designated a 'major ststem' by
the head of the agency responsible for the system ".
SOURCE: U.S., Congress, The Committee of Conference,
Dep artment Of Defense Authorization Act. 1935, on
H.R. 5167, P8th Cong., 2nd sess., 1934.
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